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I. INTRODUCTION
Tenure' is the crowning laurel of academia. The process of review-
ing a candidate for tenure at the university level generally begins with
an evaluation and recommendation by a group of the candidate's peers.2
1. "Tenure is a university institution that grants faculty members permanent and continuous
positions at the university, and ensures that a professor's services will only be terminated for ade-
quate cause." After a probationary period, typically six years, one either earns or is awarded tenure
based on the particular system in place. Kluger, Sex Discrimination in the Tenure System at
American Colleges and Universities: The Judicial Response, 15 J.L. & Enuc. 319, 319 (1986); see
also AMERicAN ASs'N OF UNIvERsrrY PROFESSORS AND ASS'N OF AMERICAN COLLEGES, 1940 STATE-
MENT OF PRINcIPLEs ON ACADEmiC FREEDOM AND TENURE, reprinted in ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at
52-53 [hereinafter 1940 STATEMENT] (stating that the goals of tenure are to protect academic free-
dom and to provide economic security); 1982 RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL. REGULATIONS ON ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, reprinted in ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 15a-20a (clarifying the
term of appointment and the conditions under which such appointments may be terminated).
2. The tenure review process typically involves screening by several groups within the univer-
sity. First, the department reviews the candidate and recommends that tenure be granted or de-
nied. Second, a special tenure review committee composed of deans and faculty members reviews
the candidate. The president and board of trustees make the final decision on whether to grant
tenure. The evidence used to review the candidate includes letters of recommendation from fellow
faculty and students, a review of published materials, and a self-evaluation expressing the candi-
date's future goals. Kluger, supra note 1, at 319-20.
Courts have acknowledged, however, "that the faculty has at least the initial, if not the pri-
mary, responsibility for judging candidates. '[Tihe peer review system has evolved as the most
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Candidates who are denied tenure may seek judicial review of the deci-
sion and discovery of peer review materials. Not surprisingly, universi-
ties encourage courts to defer to tenure decisions and to deny plaintiffs
access to confidential peer review documents.
Traditionally, in fact, courts have given great deference to univer-
sity tenure decisions.3 Judicial deference has pervaded every phase of
review from discovery to trial and remedy.4 As deference to university
tenure decisions and the confidentiality of the tenure review process
have become increasingly entrenched, another branch of law has
developed.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 prohibits discrimination
in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
reliable method for assuring promotion of the candidates best qualified to serve the needs of the
institution.'" Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 548 (3d Cir. 1980) (quoting Johnson v.
University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 (W.D. Pa. 1977)).
3. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (stating that "judges
asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision. . . should show great respect for
the faculty's professional judgment"); Kumar v. Trustees of the Univ. of Mass., 774 F.2d 1, 12 (1st
Cir.) (Campbell, C.J., concurring) (stating that "courts must be extremely wary of intruding into
the world of university tenure decisions"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1097 (1985); Faro v. New York
Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974) (asserting that of "all fields, which the federal courts
should hesitate to invade and take over, education and faculty appointments at a University level
are probably the least suited for federal court supervision"); see also Johnson, 435 F. Supp. at
1353, 1371 (explaining that the court is not a "Super Tenure Committee" and "is way beyond its
field of expertise" when asked to review tenure decisions); Green v. Board of Regents of Tex. Tech.
Univ., 335 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (questioning whether a court should "substitute its
judgment for the rational and well-considered judgement of those possessing expertise in the
field"), afl'd, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973).
Commentators also have acknowledged this deference. See, e.g., Gregory, Secrecy in Univer-
sity and College Tenure Deliberations: Placing Appropriate Limits on Academic Freedom, 16
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1023, 1034-36 (1983) (addressing the traditional judicial stance in the review of
university decisions); Note, The Challenge to Antidiscrimination Enforcement on Campus: Con-
sideration of an Academic Freedom Privilege, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 546, 553 (1983) (noting the
historical aversion courts have for reviewing tenure decisions).
4. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983) (refus-
ing to compel disclosure of peer review materials); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir.)
(affirming the district court's decision that award of tenure is not appropriate relief), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 923 (1980).
5. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988)). Title VII provisions outline "'an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure'
that enables the Commission [EEOC] to detect and remedy instances of discrimination." EEOC v.
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
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Although universities originally were excluded from Title VII coverage,
Congress eliminated that exclusion in 1972, thereby bringing universi-
ties within the scope of Title VII.7 Congress recognized that the univer-
sity was no less likely to discriminate than any other employer.' In fact,
Congress found discrimination in the academic community even more
troubling than in other areas because of the effect on the Nation's
youth.9
Since these two different historical progressions met in 1972, con-
frontations between the university, with its concerns for confidentiality
and autonomy, and the enforcement of Title VII were inevitable. The
dilemma posed is exceedingly complex."0 Should the university's desire
for confidentiality and autonomy trump the social goal of eradicating
discrimination or, in the alternative, should Title VII concerns prevail
over university concerns, which often are presented under the name of
academic freedom?"
Not surprisingly, some courts find university Title VII cases much
more difficult to review than other Title VII cases.' 2 Traditionally, uni-
7. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2155 [hereinafter EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT]; see generally Note, Title VII Remedies: Reinstatement and the Innocent Incumbent Em-
ployee, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1444-47 (1989).
8. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT, supra note 7, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2155.
9. Id.
10. The Seventh Circuit, deferential to university decisions, has articulated the dilemma:
[A]n experienced faculty committee might-quite rightly-come to different conclusions
about the potential of the candidates. It is not our place to question the significance or valid-
ity of such conclusions.
But to say all that is only to face up to the problem. The problem remains: faculty votes
should not be permitted to camouflage discrimination, even the unconscious discrimination of
well-meaning and established scholars. The courts have struggled with the problem since Ti-
tle VII was extended to the university, and have found no solution.
Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 769 F.2d 1235, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985).
11. A recent Title VII case has made it clear that "Title VII strikes a balance between pro-
tecting employees from unlawful discrimination and preserving for employers their remaining free-
dom of choice." Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 346 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990).
12. In a recent case, the Second Circuit articulated five factors that make the tenure deci-
sions more difficult to review than other employment decisions:
(1) The lifelong commitment by the university that tenure entails accentuates the impor-
tance of colleagueship among professors.
(2) Tenure decisions are often non-competitive. An award of tenure to one individual
does not necessarily preclude the tenure of another whereas in other areas of employment a
decision to hire one person means a decision not to hire another.
(3) Tenure decisions are unusually decentralized, and there is greater deference given to
the department's position than in most employment decision-making processes.
(4) There are numerous factors that a school considers in tenure deliberations that are
peculiar to the university setting.
(5) Tenure decisions are often a source of unusually great disagreement, and because
opinions of a candidate are solicited from students, faculty members and outside persons,
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versity Title VII plaintiffs have been less successful than plaintiffs in
other Title VII actions."3 In the name of judicial deference to university
decisions, courts have thrown up blockades in the path of the aggrieved
tenure candidate. First, some courts have inhibited the discovery pro-
cess through the use of privileges and balancing tests. 4 Second, the or-
der of proof and burdens at trial have been very difficult for the
plaintiff to meet.15 Finally, even upon discovering the existence of dis-
crimination in the peer review process, courts have been reluctant to
order tenure as a remedy, thereby failing to meet one of the goals of
Title VII-to make the plaintiff whole.' 6
Although discovery has been at issue in nearly every jurisdiction in
tenure files are frequently composed of irreconcilable evaluations.
Kluger, supra note 1, at 330 (quoting Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1984)
(affirming summary judgment for the university)); see also Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp.
1397, 1404 (D. Mass. 1989) (stating that the courts allow academic tenure decisions more subjectiv-
ity because selecting a professor is very different from selecting a regular employee).
13. A plaintiff seeking reversal of a tenure denial through Title VII "has an even tougher row
to hoe than other Title VII plaintiffs." Shanor & Shanor, The Practical Labor Lawyer: Title VII
and University Tenure Denial Decisions, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 145, 146 (1981).
14. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
15. The order and allocation of proof for Title VII litigation was outlined in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973):
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that
he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv)
that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek ap-
plicants from persons of complainant's qualifications .... The burden then must shift to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.
Finally the complainant must have an "opportunity to demonstrate that petitioner's assigned
reason.. . was a pretext or discriminatory in its application."
Id. at 807.
This Note will not discuss the actual proof at trial, but a number of other articles do. See
generally Tepker, Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Academic Autonomy: Toward
a Principled Deference, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1047 (1983). Professor Tepker explains that most
actions against universities have been based on the disparate treatment theory under which one
must show intentional discrimination. Id. at 1050. This theory is very deferential to the university.
Id. at 1068. A second method of proving discrimination is the disparate impact theory espoused in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Under Griggs if "illegal disparate impact is shown,
discriminatory intent need not be proved as a condition precedent to a plaintiff's recovery."
Tepker, supra, at 1073; see also Note, The Ineffectiveness of Title VII in Tenure Denial Deci-
sions, 36 DEPAUL L. REv. 259, 281 (1987) (urging courts to reject the McDonnell Douglas analysis
in tenure denial cases and to put the ultimate burden of proof on the defendant; therefore, after
plaintiff showed only an inference of discrimination, the defendant would have the burden of prov-
ing lack of discriminatory motive by a preponderance of the evidence); Note, Title VII in
Academia: A Critical Analysis of the Judicial Policy of Deference, 64 WAsH. U.L.Q. 619, 631
(1986) (suggesting that defendant should have the burden of proving that the "non-existence of
discrimination is as probable as the existence of discrimination" (emphasis deleted)).
16. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
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the country,17 the United States Supreme Court did not address the
issue until University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.8 In that case the
Court refused to create a special privilege to prevent disclosure of peer
review materials in a Title VII case, 19 thereby resolving a circuit split.20
In the area of remedy, Kunda v. Muhlenberg College21 and more re-
cently Brown v. Trustees of Boston University 2 stand for the proposi-
tion that the award of tenure is a potential remedy for victims of
discrimination.
Are these changes in the judicial stance on discovery and remedy
the beginning of the end for judicial deference to university decisions?
Or are they merely facial changes giving the appearance of bringing uni-
versity plaintiffs up to par with other Title VII plaintiffs? If the bur-
dens of proof at trial are more taxing in university Title VII cases than
those imposed on other Title VII plaintiffs, then any changes in discov-
ery and remedy will not make all Title VII plaintiffs equal.
This Note will discuss discovery of peer review materials in the in-
vestigation of a Title VII claim, tenure as a potential remedy flowing
from a successful action, and the interaction of academic freedom with
discovery and remedy issues. Part II examines two recent cases that
have had an impact on discovery and remedy. Part III explores the his-
tory of academic freedom in both its academic and legal definitions.
Part IV focuses on the issue of discovery in university Title VII cases,
and Part V addresses the issue of remedy in successful university Title
VII cases. Finally, Part VI concludes that University of Pennsylvania
and Brown mark the beginning of a new phase for university Title VII
plaintiffs by providing them with the opportunity to prevail.
II. RECENT CASES CHANGING UNIVERSITY TITLE VII LAW IN THE
AREAS OF DISCOVERY AND REMEDY
Two cases in which universities relied on a claim of academic free-
dom set the backdrop for this discussion. In one case the university
used academic freedom in an attempt to preclude the plaintiff from
gaining access to peer review materials. In the other case the university
tried to use academic freedom to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining
17. See infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
18. 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990), aff'g 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988).
19. See 110 S. Ct. at 582.
20. At odds were the Seventh Circuit's approach in EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du
Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 331 (recognizing a qualified privilege), and the Third Circuit's approach in
EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988) and EEOC v. Franklin & Mar-
shall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting a privilege for peer review materials), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
21. 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
22. 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990).
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tenure as a remedy.
A. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
23
Rosalie Tung, an associate professor at the University of Pennsyl-
vania's Wharton School, was denied tenure in 1985. Subsequently, she
filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) on the basis of race, sex, and national ori-
gin.24 The EEOC began an investigation of Tung's charge, but was
unable to obtain tenure-review materials relating to her case even after
issuing a subpoena. 25 The EEOC sought enforcement of the subpoena,
and the district court entered an enforcement order, which the court of
appeals later affirmed.2
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the university
asked the Court to recognize a qualified privilege, which, based either
on common-law principles or on its first amendment right of academic
freedom, would prevent disclosure of confidential peer review materi-
als. Under either theory, the university sought a qualified privilege
which would require a judicial finding that the plaintiff had a specific
need for access, instead of merely showing relevance 28 before the EEOC
could gain access to peer review materials. The Court refused to create
such a privilege. 9
University of Pennsylvania presented many perplexing legal ques-
tions.30 Consequently, the Court's holding is significant for several rea-
sons. First, the case provides a dispositive ruling on the privilege
question. 1 Second, the case offers guidance on other discovery issues in
university Title VII cases.3 2 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, for
the first time a majority of the court clearly acknowledged the existence
of institutional academic freedom. 3
23. 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990), aff'g 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988).
24. 110 S. Ct. at 580.
25. Id. For a description of the procedures used in enforcing Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5 (1988).
26. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 577, 581; see EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania,
805 F.2d 969 (1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
27. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 581.
28. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
29. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 582.
30. See Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE
L.J. 251, 317-20 (1989).
31. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 582.
32. Id. at 582-83.
33. Id. at 586-88.
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B. Brown v. Trustees of Boston University3 4
After being denied tenure, Julia Prewett Brown sued Boston Uni-
versity claiming breach of contract and violation of Title VII. A jury
found that the university had breached the antidiscrimination provision
of its collective bargaining agreement. The district court then applied
the jury's finding of sex discrimination to the other claims and ordered
monetary damages, enjoined the university from discriminating against
Brown, and awarded tenure to Brown. 5
Brown marks the third instance of a circuit court upholding an
award of tenure as a remedy after unlawful discrimination.3 6 In fact,
Brown may be the most controversial case to award the tenure remedy
because the court was willing to grant tenure even though the candi-
date's qualifications were in dispute. With this decision, the award of
tenure may be fully accepted as a legitimate judicial remedy. Although
the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue, it is unlikely that it
would dispute the idea that tenure is a proper remedy.37 Now that the
award of tenure is an available remedy, the question remains: How
many courts will be brave enough to use it?
III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. The Meaning of Academic Freedom Prior to University of
Pennsylvania v. EEOC
The traditional definition of academic freedom is based on the
freedom of the individual scholar to teach and research without inter-
vention .3 Today, however, courts and academics face dual definitions of
academic freedom.3 9 One definition has its roots in the academic com-
munity; the other finds support in court opinions. 40 The academic defi-
34. 891 F.2d 337, 340 (lst Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990).
35. Id.
36. For previous decisions, see Ford v. Nicks, 741 F.2d 858 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1216 (1984), and Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
37. This conclusion is logical because the goal of Title VII is to make the plaintiff whole. If
tenure is the sole remedy capable of making the plaintiff whole, why would a court challenge its
legitimacy? See infra notes 219-40 and accompanying text.
38. Over 50 years ago, Arthur 0. Lovejoy wrote a very influential definition of "academic
freedom." Academic freedom is the:
freedom of the teacher . . . to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to
express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without
interference from political or ecclesiastical authorities, or from the administrative officials of
the institution in which he is employed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of
his profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics.
Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SoCUL SCINCEs 384 (1930).
39. See generally Symposium on Academic Freedom, 66 Tax. L. Rav. 1247 (1988).
40. There are two definitions of academic freedom-one in the academic field and another in
the legal field. For a good explanation of each definition, see Byrne, supra note 30, at 255. Byrne
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nition has remained true to tradition and extends academic freedom
only to the individual scholar.4' The legal definition, however, extends
protection for academic freedom to both the individual scholar and the
academic institution.42
The dual definitions of academic freedom have created much con-
fusion.43 Even more problematic is the fact that no court or scholar has
explained the rationale or purpose behind academic freedom ade-
quately.44 The combination of dual definitions and lack of adequate
analysis has created an elusive doctrine.45 Although it may not address
every issue involved in academic freedom, University of Pennsylvania
does begin to provide some guidance on this unwieldy doctrine.
1. Academic Freedom As Defined by the Academy
Before the Civil War, professors did not consider claiming aca-
demic freedom. At that time the role of the university was to prepare
men for the clergy, law, and medicine by drilling them in the ancient
languages and math.46 Research was not essential to academic life. Only
in the postbellum days when science began to increase in importance
could academic freedom begin to develop.47
Soon the purpose of higher education shifted to educating students
in science.48 Professors began to want time to research and write and
looked longingly to the German universities devoted to research and
specialization.49 The German model boasted Lehrfrieheit, teaching free-
dom; Lernfreiheit, learning freedom; and Freiheit der Wissenschaft,
defines academic freedom as "a non-legal term referring to the liberties claimed by professors
through professional channels against administrative or political interference with research, teach-
ing, and governance." Id. He then uses the term "constitutional academic freedom" when referring
to the legal definition, which protects "scholarship and liberal education from extramural political
interference." Id; see also Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic
Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1265 (1988) (referring to the professional definition and the
constitutional definition). This Note will use the terms "individual academic freedom" and "insti-
tutional academic freedom."
41. See 1940 STATEmENT, supra note 1 (discussing only instructors, not institutions).
42. See infra notes 63-106 and accompanying text; see generally Yudof, Three Faces of Aca-
demic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. Rav. 831 (1987) (arguing that the three faces of academic freedom are
professional autonomy, limits on governmental indoctrination through schools, and institutional
autonomy).
43. See Byrne, supra note 30, at 252.
44. Id. at 253; see also Metzger, supra note 40, at 1290 (noting that court opinions make this
same charge).
45. See Byrne, supra note 30, at 253 (describing academic freedom as a doctrine that "floats
in the law, picking up [judicial] decisions as a hull does barnacles").
46. Id. at 269.
47. Id. at 269-70.
48. Id. at 269-72.
49. Id. at 270, 272.
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the university's right to control its own internal affairs. °
I In the early 1900s professors seeking to keep lay trustees from in-
terfering in their scientific research began to rally for academic free-
dom.5 In 1915 the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) formed a committee to focus on academic freedom.5 2 Because
many members of the committee had earned degrees in Germany,53
Lehrfrieheit naturally became the basis of the 1915 Declaration of
Principles.5 4
The 1915 Principles provided a comprehensive shield 55 by protect-
ing not only the freedom to teach and research5 6 as in the German con-
cept, but also the freedom to express opinions on controversial topics
even when those topics fell outside the scope of a professor's academic
specialty.57 Academic freedom clearly was created for the individual in-
structor, not for the institution.5
In 1940 the AAUP produced the 1940 Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure,59 which summarizes the academic free-
50. Metzger, supra note 40, at 1269-70.
51. Byrne, supra note 30, at 272.
52. Metzger, supra note 40, at 1268.
53. Id. at 1269.
54. Id. at 1274; see THE 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN AsS'N OF UNIvERSITY PROFESSORS 157-58 (L. Joughin
ed. 1967) [hereinafter 1915 PRINCIPLES].
55. See Metzger, supra note 40, at 1274.
56. In studying natural science, social science, philosophy, and religion, professors must have
"complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results. Such freedom is the
breath in the nostrils of all scientific activity." 1915 PRINCIPLES, supra note 54, at 164.
57. Id. at 172. The 1915 Principles protected the "freedom of extra-mural utterance and
action." Id. at 158.
58. Metzger, supra note 40, at 1284; see also 1915 PRINCIPLES, supra note 54, at 158-59 (stat-
ing that "[it need scarcely be pointed out that the freedom which is the subject of this report is
that of the teacher"). The 1915 Principles make the distinction between professor and student. It
never would have dawned on the drafters to make a distinction between professor and university.
59. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure states:
The purpose of this statement is to promote public understanding and support of aca-
demic freedom and tenure and agreement upon procedures to assure them in colleges and
universities. Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good and not to
further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common
good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies to both teaching and re-
search. Freedom in research is fundamental to the advancement of truth. Academic freedom
in its teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching
and of the student to freedom in learning. It carries with it duties correlative with rights.
1940 STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 52 (footnote omitted). The statement also asserts that under
academic freedom:
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the re-
sults, subject to the adequate performance of his other academic duties; but research for pe-
cuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his subject, but he
1580
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dom rights faculty members enjoy.60 The 1940 Statement also reveals
the interrelationship of academic freedom and tenure. According to the
AAUP, tenure is the means of protecting academic freedom." The 1940
Statement and later AAUP documents set the definition of academic
freedom for the academic community.62
2. Academic Freedom As Defined by the Court
Although courts have been using the term "academic freedom"
since 1952,63 critics charge that courts have neither defined the term
adequately 4 nor expounded on which rights academic freedom protects
and why.6 5
a. Academic Freedom for the Individual Faculty Member
Although the academy began developing its concept of academic
freedom for the individual faculty member soon after the Civil War, 6
the courts did not recognize any constitutional protection until the
should be careful not to introduce into his teaching controversial matter which has no relation
to his subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the insti-
tution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned profession, and an
officer of an educational institution. When he speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free
from institutional censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community imposes
special obligations. As a man of learning and an educational officer, he should remember that
the public may judge his profession and his institution by his utterances. Hence he should at
all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opin-
ions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he is not an institutional
spokesman.
Id.
60. See Byrne, supra note 30, at 279.
61. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 52.
62. See Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 TEx.
L. REv. 1323, 1324 (1988).
63. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 508-11 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. See Byrne, supra note 30, at 252-55; Metzger, supra note 40, at 1289 (citing to David
Rabban and other commentators who argue that the "Supreme Court constitutionalized academic
freedom without adequately defining it"). But see Metzger, supra note 40, at 1291 (stating that the
Court did know what it meant by academic freedom).
65. See Rabban, Academic Freedom, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 12
(1986) (stating that the Court has never clarified whether academic freedom is a distinctive liberty
with its own constitutional contours or is simply an exemplification of the first amendment rights
vouchsafed to other citizens); see also Byrne, supra note 30, at 253 (stating that the Court has
provided no "adequate analysis of what academic freedom the Constitution protects or why it
protects it").
Commentators are not the only ones to acknowledge this missing analysis. An Oregon federal
district court judge has written: "[flew courts have considered whether and to what extent the
First Amendment protects academic freedom. . . . Lower courts have spoken more frequently,
but none has clearly defined the theory's legal contours." Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358,
1362 (D. Or. 1976), cited in Metzger, supra note 40, at 1290.
66. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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1950s s7 when the government used loyalty tests to remove subversive
teachers."8 Sweezy v. New Hampshire9 marked the birth of constitu-
tional academic freedom.70 Justice Felix Frankfurter, in his concurring
opinion, recognized the importance of maintaining a spirit of free in-
quiry 1 within a university and creating an atmosphere "in which there
prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."72 Thus on June
67. See Adler, 342 U.S. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that all members of
society, especially teachers, need constitutional protection for thought). In his dissenting opinion
in Adler, Justice William 0. Douglas introduced the term "academic freedom" when he wrote that
the "system of spying and surveillance ... cannot go hand in hand with academic freedom." Id. at
510-11. But see Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 111-12, 289 S.W. 363, 365 (1927) (finding no consti-
tutional protection for a governmental employee in 1927).
68. McCarthyism was the threat that forced the Court to begin developing a doctrine of aca-
demic freedom. Threats to academic freedom continue today although in different forms. Present
threats to academic freedom arise from universities, "Accuracy in Academia" (AIA), and the fed-
eral government. See Strohm, Convocation on Current Threats to Academic Freedom, ACADEME,
Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 41. The AAUP committee on academic freedom censures academic institutions
that are found to have violated a professor's academic freedom. See Blum, How Censure Decisions
Are Reached, The Chronicle of Higher Educ., June 28, 1989, at A18, col. 4. For example, the
AAUP committee on academic freedom recently found that Catholic University violated Rev.
Charles E. Curran's academic freedom. The university had barred him from teaching theology
after a Vatican censure regarding Curran's published views on birth control and abortion. See
Steinfels, Report on Priest Assails University, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1989, at A17, col. 1 (city ed.).
In addition, the AAUP has sponsored a convocation to explore today's threats to academic
freedom, which include AIA and the federal government. AIA has stated that it is a watchdog
group that will detect academic error by using student recruits in the classroom. Also, the govern-
ment is restricting academic freedom by trying to control unclassified information. According to
Robert Park of the American Physical Society, many scientists feel pressured to withdraw unclas-
sified contributions from conferences. The National Security Decision Directive 84, requiring that
those with access to certain levels of classified information sign prepublication review agreements,
is a further threat to academic freedom. Over 150,000 people have signed these lifetime contracts
that limit their freedom to share the results of their research. See Strohm, supra, at 42.
69. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). The Supreme Court reversed a contempt order entered against
Sweezy after he refused to answer questions before a legislative committee. New Hampshire statu-
tory provisions required that all governmental personnel take a loyalty oath stating that they were
not subversive. Id. at 236. The statutes also authorized the formation of a committee to investigate
"violations of the subversive activities act of 1951." Id. at 236-37. The committee questioned
Sweezy on two occasions. He refused to answer questions about his knowledge of the Progressive
Party of New Hampshire and the subject of one of his lectures. Id. at 238, 243-44.
70. Five years earlier Justice Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, did use the phrase "academic
freedom" when he wrote that academic freedom is central to "the pursuit of truth which the First
Amendment was designed to protect." Adler, 342 U.S. at 511 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with majority's upholding of the Feinberg laws).
71. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262.
72. Id. at 263. Justice Felix Frankfurter relied on a statement from a conference of South
African scholars. Id. One modem scholar has suggested that the root of Justice Frankfurter's con-
cern was "the threat of McCarthyism to the autonomy of universities, rather than with a violation
of any individual professor's rights." Byrne, supra note 30, at 313.
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17, 1957,1s the Court, without ceremony, robed academic freedom in the
garb of constitutional protection. 4
The Supreme Court next addressed academic freedom in Keyi-
shian v. Board of Regents,75 a case in which the Court found that the
Feinberg laws76 had been applied unconstitutionally to professors at the
State University of New York in 1967." In his majority opinion, Justice
William Brennan wrote:
Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.. .. The classroom is
peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas."'18
Scholars have argued that although this statement was intended to de-
fine academic freedom further, in reality the statement served only to
confuse. 9 As remarkable as it may seem, Sweezy and Keyishian are the
only cases in which the Supreme Court has developed the concept of
individual academic freedom.80
b. Academic Freedom for the Institution
That the individual scholar should enjoy academic freedom is not a
particularly difficult idea to grasp. That the academic institution also
should enjoy the first amendment right of academic freedom is some-
what more problematic."' According to one critic, the concept of institu-
tional academic freedom is difficult for many to accept because it does
73. This date was dubbed "Red Monday" because the Supreme Court handed down Sweezy
and another controversial loyalty decision. See Byrne, supra note 30, at 291 & n.149.
74. Neither the Supreme Court nor the press acknowledged that the Court was making law
when it found that the first amendment protected academic freedom. See Byrne, supra 30, at 291.
Byrne cites several oddities in the Sweezy opinion. He notes that the Court had never suggested
that the first amendment protected academic freedom and that Justice Felix Frankfurter relied on
nonlegal sources to discuss academic freedom. Id. at 290-93.
75. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Between the decisions of Sweezy and Keyishian, the Court decided
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), affirming the conviction of a professor after he
refused to answer questions posed by the House Un-American Activities Committee regarding
Communist activities by students. One commentator has noted that the case did very little to
develop the concept of academic freedom. See Byrne, supra note 30, at 294.
76. The Feinberg laws were "a series of statutes and regulations intended to bar 'subversive'
persons from employment." Byrne, supra note 30, at 295.
77. Id. But see Adler, 342 U.S. at 485 (upholding the application of the Feinberg laws to
school teachers).
78. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted).
79. See Byrne, supra note 30, at 295-98. Byrne accuses the Court of writing a vague opinion
that fails to distinguish between "protected and punishable academic speech." Id. at 295.
80. See id. at 298.
81. See id. at 311-12 (noting that commentators who have understood academic freedom to
protect the individual scholar are shocked that the concept has been extended to protect the
university).
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not appear to be grounded in the traditions of the Constitution or of
education.8 2 Even more perplexing is how both parties could utilize aca-
demic freedom in a dispute between a university and a professor. If the
university is protected, then the individual, who also claims academic
freedom protection, will be punished.83 The concept is unquestionably
contradictory.
Although the AAUP chose to ignore the German concept of
Freiheit der Wissenschaft84 and defined academic freedom only from
the standpoint of the individual, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
an institutional academic freedom. One commentator believes that, re-
alizing it was straying from the traditional definition of academic free-
dom, the Court constitutionalized institutional academic freedom so
that institutions could make educational decisions without governmen-
tal interference.85 The Court has been developing the concept of institu-
tional academic freedom since Sweezy.
Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy set forth
the four essential freedoms of the university and marked the first devel-
opmental phase of institutional academic freedom.8 6 Thirty years
passed before the Court again pursued its development of the concept
of institutional academic freedom. In 1978 the Court found the Univer-
sity of California at Davis Medical School's admissions program to be
unconstitutional in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.87
Justice Lewis Powell's opinion further shaped the doctrine of insti-
tutional academic freedom. By relying on Sweezy's freedom to deter-
mine which students may be admitted, Justice Powell found the
university's goal of striving for an ethnically diverse student body to be
legitimate.88 Justice Powell stated that academic freedom had long been
a special, although unenumerated, concern of the first amendment.8,
In his concurring opinion in Widmar v. Vincent,90 Justice John
Paul Stevens relied on the concept of institutional academic freedom.
The majority held that a University of Missouri regulation, disallowing
student prayer meetings on campus while allowing other group meet-
ings on campus, was unconstitutional.9 1 Justice Stevens acknowledged a
freedom to make administrative decisions, but concluded that the free-
82. See id. at 320.
83. See id.
84. See Metzger, supra note 40, at 1269-70 (defining "Freiheit der Wissenschaft").
85. See Byrne, supra note 30, at 311, 321.
86. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
87. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
88. Id. at 311-12.
89. Id. at 312.
90. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
91. See id. at 270-73.
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dom did not extend to circumstances in which the university tried to
penalize a speaker for holding a viewpoint contrary to the university's.""
In Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing" a unanimous
majority opinion referred to academic freedom for the institution. In
Ewing a medical student argued that the university had violated sub-
stantive due process by dismissing him after he failed an examination.
He insisted that the university arbitrarily refused to allow him to retake
the exam.94 The Court would not interfere in the university's decision,
stating that genuinely academic decisions should be afforded great def-
erence.95 In a footnote, Justice Stevens stated that academic freedom
depends both on the uninhibited exchange of ideas among the faculty
and the students and on the university's freedom to make autonomous
decisions.96
B. Institutional Academic Freedom Acknowledged and Defined by
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
A majority opinion finally referred to institutional academic free-
dom in Ewing. The Court relegated this reference to a footnote, how-
ever. Therefore, it was still difficult to conclude that a majority of the
Court truly had accepted the notion of institutional academic
freedom. 97
In its 1990 decision in University of Pennsylvania,98 however, a
majority of the Court clearly embraced the notion of institutional aca-
demic freedom. The unanimous Court not only recognized the doctrine,
but also began to define its scope.99 While past decisions had revealed
only that academic freedom is a "special concern of the first amend-
ment,"'10 in University of Pennsylvania the Court began defining the
92. See id. at 280 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
94. Id. at 223.
95. See id. at 225. The Court wrote:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this
one, they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may
not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
96. Id. at 226 n.12.
97. Prior to Ewing, commentators noted that a majority of the Supreme Court had never
explicitly recognized institutional academic freedom. See Gregory, supra note 3, at 1044-45; Note,
Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARv. L. REv. 879 (1979).
98. 110 S. Ct. 577, 586-88 (1990).
99. One commentator has recognized that in University of Pennsylvania the Court had the
opportunity to clarify the significance of institutional academic freedom whose "strength and reach
...remain in doubt." Byrne, supra note 30, at 317-18.
100. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
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contours of this real, but elusive, constitutional freedom.
Instead of analyzing why the academic institution should enjoy
constitutional protection, the Court looked to its past academic free-
dom decisions and followed their guidelines. Seeming somewhat embar-
rassed by this ill-defined doctrine, the Court described the precedent on
which the university relied as "the so-called academic freedom
cases."'10 1 Perhaps the Court realized that it had opened a Pandora's
box in prior decisions and wanted to try to contain the damage with the
University of Pennsylvania decision.
The Court determined that precedent has allowed a university aca-
demic freedom protection in two situations. First, a university has en-
joyed protection when governmental action is "content-based
regulation."' 12 Because the University of Pennsylvania did not argue
that the EEOC subpoenas were causing the university to direct its aca-
demic activities in a prescribed way, the Court found that the govern-
mental action was not content-based regulation that violated academic
freedom.10 3
The second instance in which a university has enjoyed academic
freedom is when the governmental action directly infringes on the uni-
versity's right to decide who may teach.10 4 In this case the Court deter-
mined that the EEOC subpoena did not directly infringe on that right
because the EEOC provided no criteria that the university had to fol-
low in selecting its professors. 0 5 The Court found that these two in-
stances marked the current limits of academic freedom and refused to
expand the doctrine of academic freedom to protect confidential peer
review materials.10 6
IV. DISCOVERY IN UNIVERSITY TITLE VII CASES AND ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
In regular civil actions a party can discover any nonprivileged ma-
terial that is "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action.' 0 7 Congress set a separate standard for Title VII discovery that
allows "access to. . . any evidence. . . that relates to unlawful employ-
101. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 586.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 587. The Court distinguished Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 589, in which the govern-
ment wanted to substitute its teaching criteria for the standards already in place at the academic
institution. That was not the situation in University of Pennsylvania. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The desire for full and open discovery is espoused in the Su-
preme Court's principle that "the public ... has a right to every man's evidence." United States
v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
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ment practices . . . and is relevant to the charge under investiga-
tion. ''1°s Relevance is again the standard by which discovery is
permitted.10
When the EEOC is investigating an alleged Title VII violation, dis-
covery is even broader than that normally afforded civil plaintiffs.110
Congress wanted the EEOC to have extensive access to evidence to
carry out its duties of investigating discrimination."' In a university
Title VII case, the EEOC typically will try to gain access to the deliber-
ations and evaluations of the peer review committee to determine
whether any discriminatory motive existed in denying tenure." 2 If the
institution refuses to disclose peer review materials, the EEOC has the
authority to issue a subpoena and to seek an order to enforce the sub-
poena.113 Although some courts have expressed concern that EEOC in-
vestigations prior to the filing of an action can be too extensive,' 4
Congress wanted a very broad discovery process.
A. Circuit Split Prior to University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
Courts asked to compel the disclosure of peer review materials in
discovery have had to choose between recognizing some sort of privilege
to prevent disclosure, utilizing a balancing test, issuing a protective or-
der, or ordering disclosure. Courts have split on the decision of whether
to order disclosure of peer review materials. Some courts have recog-
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1988). See generally Annotation, Discovery Under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, in Actions Brought by Private Plaintiffs under Equal Employment Op-
portunity Provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1964, As Amended (42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e et seq.), 31
A.L.R. FED. 657 (1977).
109. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984). The Court stated:
Since the enactment of Title VII, courts have generously construed the term "relevant" and
have afforded the Commission access to virtually any material that might cast light on the
allegations against the employer. In 1972, Congress undoubtedly was aware of the manner in
which the courts were construing the concept of "relevance" and implicitly endorsed it by
leaving intact the statutory definition of the Commission's investigative authority.
Id. (footnote omitted).
110. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 583; EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall Col-
lege, 775 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that relevancy is to be "construed broadly when a
charge is in the investigatory stage"), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986).
111. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 582-83.
112. See Note, Title VII and Academic Freedom: The Authority of the EEOC to Investigate
College Faculty Tenure Decisions, 28 B.C.L. R.v. 559, 560 (1987).
113. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 583.
114. These courts criticize instances in which an EEOC investigation becomes "'a fishing
expedition,' or exploratory surgery without the required prior medical testing, screening, evalua-
tion and diagnosis." EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 339 (7th Cir. 1983);
see also Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d at 120 (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that
congressional intent could be served "without conferring on the EEOC such absolute and unyield-
ing investigatory powers to embark upon a fishing expedition into confidential materials").
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nized a qualified privilege."-5 Others have instituted a balancing test to
take into account both the university's interest in confidentiality and
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining information to prove discrimina-
tion.11 6 Finally, some courts have afforded the university no special con-
sideration and have ordered disclosure of peer review materials'17 and
peer votes."'
The AAUP has endorsed a position on the discovery issue. Under
the AAUP's position, peer review committees would be granted a quali-
fied privilege that the plaintiff could overcome if the facts of a particu-
lar case "raise[d] a sufficient inference that some impermissible
consideration was likely to have played a role.""'  Thus, the AAUP
joined the group of commentators endorsing a qualified privilege such
as the University of Pennsylvania sought. 20
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in University of Pennsylva-
nia,"' commentators endorsed every imaginable solution to this per-
plexing problem. Many commentators rejected the idea of any privilege
whether qualified or absolute. 22 Some supported the idea of having the
plaintiff make an initial showing before the court could compel disclo-
115. See Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d at 331 (allowing a privilege to protect the identities
of the academics participating in the peer review process); see also Zaustinsky v. University of
Cal., 96 F.R.D. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (allowing privilege after finding all of the criteria of Wigmore
on Evidence met); McKillop v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 386 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1975)
(allowing privilege for tenure files under state law).
116. See Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne
College, 552 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
117. See EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
577 (1990); Orbovich v. Macalester College, No. 4-87-973 (D. Minn. Mar. 9, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file); Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d at 110.
118. See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1981).
119. AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIVEnsrrY PROFESSORS, A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON JUDICIALLY
COMPELLED DISCLOSURE IN THE NONRENEWAL OF FACULTY APPOINTMENTS, reprinted in ACADEME,
Feb.-Mar. 1981, at 27. The AAUP recommends that the court weigh the following factors in decid-
ing whether to compel disclosure:
the adequacy of the procedures employed in the nonrenewal decision, the adequacy of the
reasons offered in defense of the decision, the adequacy of the review procedures internal to
the institution, statistical evidence that might give rise to an inference of discrimination, fac-
tual assertions of statements or incidents that indicate personal bias or prejudices on the part
of the participants, the availability of the information sought from other sources, and the
importance of the information sought to the issues presented.
Id. For a more thorough discussion of the AAUP approach, see Finkin, On Judicially Compelled
Disclosure, ACADEME, Aug. 1981, at 181.
120. See infra note 128 and sources cited therein.
121. 110 S. Ct. at 577.
122. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv.
1450, 1629 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications]; Gregory, supra note 3, at 1023; Note,
supra note 3, at 546; Gray, Faculty Members Who File Tenure Grievances Should Have Access to
Relevant -Personnel Files, The Chronicle of Higher Educ., Nov. 1, 1989, at B1, col. 1.
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sure of peer review materials.12 Others looked to Gray v. Board of
Higher Education124 and urged judicial balancing on a case by case ba-
sis.125 Some stated that protective orders could protect the interests of
the academic institutions.'2 6 Another commentator suggested an en-
tirely new analysis and order of proof for disclosure cases.21 7 Many
others endorsed a qualified privilege.'28  Finally, one author even en-
dorsed an absolute privilege that would create a clear standard in re-
sponse to the ad hoc determinations that courts had been making.
29
The Supreme Court recently has provided a clear standard, but it is a
far cry from the absolute privilege that the author supported.
123. See Brooks, Confidentiality of Tenure Review and Discovery of Peer Review Materials,
1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 705. Brooks recommends that before courts allow discovery of confidential
material, the plaintiff show at least one of the following: "(1) that certain criteria of fairness in the
review process were not met, (2) that discrimination occurred outside of the tenure decision, or (3)
that the plaintiff was equally qualified for tenure or promotion as her recently tenured colleagues."
Id. at 748-49. Upon such showing, the court would compel release of confidential material, but only
that material relevant to the discrimination charge. Id. at 749; see also Note, The Double-Edged
Sword of Academic Freedom: Cutting the Scales of Justice in Title VII Litigation, 65 WASH.
U.L.Q. 445, 468 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Cutting the Scales] (suggesting that the plaintiff be re-
quired to make a prima facie case of discrimination under a burden higher than that in McDonnell
Douglas before the court compels disclosure); Note, supra note 112, at 593 (proposing a threshold
test by which a court would intervene in the EEOC investigation and consider the university's
reasons for denying tenure before allowing discovery of peer review materials); Note, Title VII in
Academia: A Critical Analysis of the Judicial Policy of Deference, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 619, 632-33
(1986) (suggesting that the plaintiff be required to provide evidence of discrimination outside the
peer review process before the court would allow limited discovery of confidential materials).
124. 692 F.2d at 901; see infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
125. See Comment, Out of Balance: The Disruptive Consequences of EEOC v. Franklin &
Marshall College, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 323 (1988).
126. See DeLano, Discovery in University Employment Discrimination Suits: Should Peer
Review Materials Be Privileged?, 14 J.C. & U.. 121 (1987) (asserting that protective order, not
privilege, is the appropriate judicial approach); see also Recent Development, A Qualified Aca-
demic Freedom Privilege in Employment Litigation: Protecting Higher Education or Shielding
Discrimination?, 40 VAD. L. RE V. 1397, 1431 (1987) (suggesting protective orders as an additional
aid in proposed two-step procedure).
127. See Note, Cutting the Scales, supra note 123, at 465-70.
128. See Tepker, supra note 15; Recent Development, supra note 126, at 1397. This author
endorses a two-step analysis. First, a qualified privilege would be allowed if the university fur-
nished a detailed statement giving the reasons for the denial of tenure. Second, the court would
allow the plaintiff to try to rebut the presumption of privilege. Recent Development, supra note
126, at 1430-31; see also Note, Title VII and the Tenure Decision: The Need for a Qualified
Academic Freedom Privilege Protecting Confidential Peer Review Materials in University Em-
ployment Discrimination Cases, 21 SUFFOLK UJL. Rav. 691, 721 (1987) (concluding that a "quali-
fied privilege protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the peer review system is necessary to
ensure that Title VII discovery does not subvert the decision making process upon which academic
freedom and university autonomy depend").
129. See Note, In Pursuit of Academic Freedom: The Peer Evaluation Privilege, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 441, 461 (1988).
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B. Failure of Privilege Approach in University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC
1. The Failure of the Common-Law Privilege Approach
Courts traditionally have recognized certain common-law privileges
including those for husband and wife, attorney and client, physician
and patient, and priest and penitent.130 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence sets guidelines by which federal courts may recognize privi-
leges.' 3' Beyond those provided by the Constitution and Congress, the
courts determine privileges by common-law principles, interpreted in
light of reason and experience. 3 2
The Supreme Court has stated that privileges are not favored and
if recognized must be narrowly construed.133 The Court has said also,
however, that it will establish a new privilege if some public good would
override the normal goal of obtaining all possible evidence.13 4 For exam-
ple, as noted in University of Pennsylvania,'3 5 the Supreme Court has
recognized a qualified privilege for Presidential communications 3 6 and
absolute privileges for grand jury 3 7 and petit jury deliberations, 3 and
for deliberative intra-agency documents. 139
In University of Pennsylvania the university had the task of con-
vincing the Court that the peer review process was worthy of a new
privilege. In light of the pervasive judicial deference to university deci-
sion making, the creation of a new privilege was not a remote possibil-
130. For a thorough examination of all of these privileges, see Privileged Communications,
supra note 122, at 1450.
131. Instead of accepting the nine nonconstitutional privileges proposed by the Supreme
Court as the exclusive list of privileges, Congress adopted rule 501, which allows courts to remain
flexible and to continue developing privileges as needed. E. GREEN & C. NESSON, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 73 (1988).
132. FED. R. EvrD. 501; see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 2285, at 527 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961) (stating the four factors needed to establish an evidentiary privilege).
133. Sere United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (stating that "[w]hatever their
origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expan-
sively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth"). But see Privileged Communi-
cations, supra note 122, at 1450, quoting a nineteenth century English case:
Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely-may be pursued too keenly-may
cost too much. And surely ... the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasi-
ness, and suspicion and fear, into those communications which must take place, and which,
unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, [is] too great a
price to pay for truth itself.
134. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980).
135. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 585.
136. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683.
137. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
138. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
139. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
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ity. The university failed to establish adequate need for a privilege,
however.4 0
One reason for this failure may be that institutional privileges,
such as that sought by the University of Pennsylvania, are more diffi-
cult to establish than individual privileges because no individual pri-
vacy arguments apply."" Also, before a court will grant an institutional
privilege, the institution must have certain characteristics.14 2 First, the
institution must fulfill a significant need in society.14 3 Second, the pro-
cess of communication must be essential to the goals of the institution
and must demand confidentiality for its effectiveness. 4 4 Finally, the in-
stitution must show that the litigants will not be unduly burdened by
the privilege. 4 5
In addition to the inherent difficulties in sustaining institutional
privileges, the fact that the University of Pennsylvania sought a privi-
lege for an internal process only contributed to its ultimate failure.4
Internal process privileges are difficult to establish both because no
proof exists that disclosure actually will chill communications and be-
cause the communication itself may give rise to litigation. 4 7 Similar
peer review process privileges have been rejected in the hospital 4 8 and
media 4 9 contexts.
140. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 582-85.
141. See Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at 1594.
142. Id. at 1593.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 218 (stating that secrecy is essential to an effective
grand jury process).
145. Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at 1593.
146. Id. at 1612.
147. Id. For a discussion of proposed governmental process privilege, editorial process privi-
lege, and peer review process privileges, see id. at 1613-29.
148. The author of Privileged Communications analyzed the peer review processes in both
the university and hospital settings. Id. at 1625-29. In comparing the two, the author noted that
while the academic peer review process had been granted privilege in some circuits, the hospital
peer review process has never been granted a common-law privilege. In Memorial Hospital v.
Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (7th Cir. 1981), the plaintiff wanted disclosure of disciplinary pro-
ceedings, which were privileged under state law, to prove an antitrust suit. The court determined
that the antitrust objectives outweighed the hospital objective of bolstering the effectiveness of in-
hospital peer review committees. In Ott v. St. Luke Hospital, 522 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Ky. 1981), the
court denied the hospital a privilege upon finding no evidence that the peer review process would
be harmed. Id. at 711-12.
Some states have statutes that preserve the confidentiality of hospital peer review materials.
Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at 1627. Statutory protection could come to
universities.
149. In University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 584, the Court analogized to Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg the Court refused to create a constitutional privilege
shielding news reporters from testifying before grand juries because it was "unclear how often and
to what extent informers [we]re actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen
[we]re forced to testify before a grand jury." Id. at 693.
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Utilizing the institutional privilege analysis referred to above, the
Court in University of Pennsylvania recognized that universities are
important to society and that confidentiality is necessary for the peer
review process to function effectively. 15 The Court, however, focused on
the final element of the institutional privilege analysis-the impact on
the plaintiff. 151 The Court determined that files in the institution's pos-
session could contain a smoking gun essential to the plaintiff's case.
The Court also concluded that a showing of particularized need was too
heavy a burden to place on the plaintiff.152
Beyond its concern for the plaintiff, the Court noted another ra-
tionale for its decision. First, the Court stated that allowing a privilege
for the university would open the floodgates to requests for privileges
from other groups including writers5' and lawyers. 54 Second, the Court
argued that the precedent cited by the university did not support its
claim because the privileges in those cases were grounded in the Consti-
tution, history, 55 or statute while the proposed privilege did not enjoy a
similar background. 56
2. The Failure of the "Academic Freedom" Privilege Approach
As an alternative to its common-law privilege argument, the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania contended that the Court should recognize a
first amendment privilege based on academic freedom. 157 In making this
argument, the university relied on the principle that it had a first
amendment right to determine who may teach.158 The university began
with the premise that the tenure system is the means by which a uni-
versity can exercise its first amendment right. Based on that premise,
the university argued that increased disclosure would have a chilling
effect on evaluations; therefore, the evaluations would not be as relia-
ble, less qualified people would be granted tenure, and, ultimately, the
150. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 587-88.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra note 149.
154. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 585.
155. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. at 218 n.9 (stating that grand
jury proceedings have been secret since the seventeenth century).
156. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 585. But see Comment, Out of Balance:
The Disruptive Consequences of EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 323,
323 & n.1 (1988) (quoting from a Papal Bull dated 1231, which stated that the confidentiality of
opinions expressed in the university tenure review process had been assured). Thus, the confidenti-
ality of the tenure review process arguably has historical roots.
157. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 581.
158. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
cited in University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 586.
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quality of scholarship would decline. 159
The Court denied the university's request for an academic freedom
privilege because the facts did not fit within the contours of academic
freedom that the Court presently recognized. 60 In other words, the ar-
gument failed because the governmental action was neither an attempt
to control the content of university speech nor a direct infringement on
the right to select the faculty. 161 Justice Harry Blackmun concluded
that the university's argument was too remote and attenuated and that
the alleged injury to academic freedom was speculative.1 6 2
3. Possible Effects of the Decision on the Peer Review Process
Both scholars'63 and courts16 4 have tried to predict whether the de-
nial of a special evidentiary privilege will affect the peer review process.
Those who supported the university continue to argue that disclosure of
confidential peer review materials will chill candid evaluations of tenure
candidates.'6 5 Under the Supreme Court's view, however, academics will
continue to give honest, candid reviews of their peers although those
evaluations may provide more specific illustrations in support of the fi-
nal recommendation to deflect potential discrimination claims.'66 Com-
159. University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 586 (quoting from the petitioner's brief).
160. Id. at 587 (concluding that "petitioner's claim does not fit neatly within any right of
academic freedom that could be derived from the cases on which petitioner relies. In essence,
petitioner asks us to recognize an expanded right of academic freedom to protect confidential peer
review materials from disclosure").
161. Id. at 586-87.
162. Id. at 588.
163. William W. Van Alstyne, general counsel for the AAUP and a law professor at Duke
University, stated: "To operate in a fishbowl is necessarily to inhibit candor." Blum, Supreme
Court Rejects Privacy Claim for Tenure Files, Says University Must Disclose Information in Bias
Case, The Chronicle of Higher Educ., Jan. 17, 1990, at A17, col. 1. Ernst Benjamin, the general
secretary of the AAUP, has predicted that there will be "'less in the files . . . more phone calls,
more use of the grapevine; really illicit means.'" Kelly, Tenure Ruling Has Universities Wary,
USA Today, Jan. 16, 1990, at 4D, col. 1. Others predict that recommendations will be much
blander or that universities will begin to rely more on outside reviewers. Mooney, Academics Are
Divided Over High-Court Ruling on Tenure Documents, The Chronicle of Higher Educ., Jan. 24,
1990, at A18, col. 1. Perhaps the most troubling opinion is that the "decision sets a tone for gov-
ernment intervention in university affairs." Id. (quoting Anne H. Fraftke, associate secretary and
counsel for the AAUP).
164. See EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1983) (as-
serting that "[w]ithout this assurance of confidentiality, academicians will be reluctant to offer
candid and frank evaluations in the future"); Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 908 (2d
Cir. 1982) (stating that "a rule allowing routine discovery of tenure votes could chill frank discus-
sion and engender disharmony among faculty"). But see EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College,
775 F.2d 110, 115 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding the view that "honesty and integrity ... will overcome
feelings of discomfort and embarrassment and will outlast the demise of absolute confidentiality").
165. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 588.
166. Justice Harry Blackmun wrote:
[W]e are not so ready as petitioner seems to be to assume the worst about those in the aca-
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mentators also have espoused this view.'
C. University Strategy for Future Title VII Cases
By considering the creation of a privilege, the Court in University
of Pennsylvania addressed the most extreme solution for handling dis-
covery of peer review materials. Courts and commentators have pro-
posed other, less radical, alternatives. In the next wave of university
Title VII cases, universities are likely to ask the courts to consider the
following options in lieu of automatic and complete disclosure.
1. Protective Orders
Under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,6 8 the
trial court has the discretion to "make any order which justice requires
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres-
sion, or undue burden or expense"'6 9 upon a showing of "good cause."' 7'
Rule 26(c) is extremely flexible and allows a court to fashion a protec-
tive order to serve the needs of a specific case. A court can use a protec-
tive order to deny discovery altogether' or to allow discovery with
some restrictions.7 2 The scope of a protective order is within the discre-
tion of the trial judge and will be reviewed under the abuse of discre-
tion standard.7 3
In Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College14 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's decision ordering the production of some personnel
records, but denying the disclosure of the confidential peer evalua-
tions. 1' 5 In Jepsen v. Florida Board of Regents 7 6 the district court
fashioned a protective order by which the plaintiff's attorney could
demic community. Although it is possible that some evaluators may become less candid as the
possibility of disclosure increases, others may simply ground their evaluations in specific ex-
amples and illustrations in order to. deflect potential claims of bias or unfairness. Not all
academics will hesitate to stand up and be counted when they evaluate their peers.
Id.
167. See Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at 1627-28. The author argues that
denying a privilege will not affect the peer review process. Instead, evaluators will give objective,
well-supported reports in an attempt to avoid reversal of their decisions. Id. at 1627.
168. FED. R Civ. P. 26(c).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
172. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2)-(8).
173. See Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
904 (1977); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973); General Dynamics Corp. V. Selb
Mfg., 481 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1973).
174. 552 F.2d at 579.
175. Id. at 580-81.
176. 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980).
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view, but not copy, the fourteen files requested if a file contained a less
than satisfactory evaluation.17 7 In Lynn v. Regents of the University of
California7 8 the district court issued a protective order completely de-
nying the plaintiff access to the file containing peer review materials. 7 9
In EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac80 the Seventh Circuit
ordered the district court to issue a protective order assuring that the
privileged materials would not be disclosed to persons not directly in-
volved in the action.' 8 '
Similarly, one commentator has suggested that limiting access to
the material to the parties, their experts, and their attorneys would be
the best use of a protective order. 8 2 This solution would allow the
plaintiff to prepare a discrimination suit, but also would assure the uni-
versity that evaluations would not be revealed to the public
unnecessarily. 83
In 1988 the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Dixon v. Rutgers, ' 8  re-
fused to allow a privilege for peer review materials. The court instead
held that trial courts should issue protective orders to prevent overly
broad discovery and unlimited access.' Now that the United States
177. Id. at 1384. The court of appeals upheld the protective order, but reversed the decision
saying that the plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce the records into evidence with
further protective orders if necessary. Id. at 1384-85.
178. 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982).
179. Id. at 1345. The district court viewed the file in camera without disclosing any of the
contents to the plaintiff.
180. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
181. Id. at 340. The court also noted that the university should not disclose the privileged
materials at all unless the EEOC found some evidence of discrimination. Id. at 340 n.7.
182. See DeLano, supra note 126, at 150 (proposing the utilization of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(c)(5)).
183. See id. at 151. Ms. DeLano has made the following suggestions about how such a protec-
tive order could work:
Confidential documents could be used during a deposition only if the witness wrote the
document, is otherwise familiar with it, or would have had independent access to it under
university regulations. Relevant portions of depositions could be sealed. The court could re-
quire any plaintiff wanting to introduce confidential documents at trial to file a motion in
limine. By the time such a motion is filed, a plaintiff should have sufficient information to
allow the court to decide whether the confidential materials should be made public during
trial.
By limiting access to confidential materials, a protective order can shield evaluations
from general scrutiny until the plaintiff has enough evidence of discrimination to go to trial.
Although it will not entirely silence the concern that a plaintiff can get access to confidential
materials merely by alleging discrimination, limiting dissemination of the confidential materi-
als should reassure evaluators that the evaluations will not unnecessarily be exposed to public
scrutiny. In light of the goals of Title VII, the peer review process cannot be completely
shielded from judicial scrutiny. Protective orders, however, can limit public scrutiny to those
cases in which the plaintiff has discovered evidence of discrimination.
Id. at 150-51.
184. 110 N.J. 432, 541 A.2d 1046 (1988).
185. See id. at 435, 541 A.2d at 1048.
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Supreme Court has followed the Rutgers holding in denying a qualified
privilege, perhaps other courts will follow the Rutgers ruling on protec-
tive orders.
Courts should follow Notre Dame and Rutgers instead of fashion-
ing protective orders denying all access to peer review materials. If
courts ever automatically denied all access to peer review materials, the
victory university Title VII plaintiffs won in University of Pennsylva-
nia will be virtually useless. One specific way that courts could use pro-
tective orders effectively would be by the use of redaction.
2. Redaction As a Specific Condition of Protective Orders
In University of Pennsylvania Justice Harry Blackmun noted that
the Court would not decide whether the petitioner could redact infor-
mation from the requested files before giving them to the EEOC 186 be-
cause the lower courts had not considered the issue fully.187 Redaction
would allow universities to remove certain information from the files
that would reveal the identity of the evaluator. By negating the argu-
ment that the disclosure of the evaluator's identity would have a chil-
ling effect on future evaluations, redaction could be a viable solution
capable of meeting the needs of both parties. a'8
The Third Circuit affirmed redaction in EEOC v. Franklin & Mar-
shall College,"5 9 and the Seventh Circuit ordered it in EEOC v. Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Du Lac.90 The Seventh Circuit even set forth an
entire process for redaction.19' These guidelines could become the na-
186. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577, 581 n.2, 589 n.9 (1990).
187. Id. at 589 n.9; see also EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 982 (3d Cir.
1988) (remanding the redaction issue to the district court), ai)'d, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990).
188. Redaction also could be useful in preserving "whatever harmony exists between individ-
ual committee members and the disgruntled plaintiff, who may continue to work side by side."
Recent Development, supra note 126, at 1431.
189. 775 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court's order to remove names
and other'identifying information of evaluators).
190. 715 F.2d at 331 (remanding to allow the university to redact); see also Jackson v.
Harvard Univ., 111 F.R.D. 472, 476 (D. Mass. 1986) (requiring that names be redacted from files
produced).
191. See University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 338-39. The court stated:
Before producing the personnel files sought by the EEOC, the University should be permitted
to redact the name, address, institutional affiliation, and any other identifying features (e.g.,
publications, professional honors received, or any other material which could be used to iden-
tify the particular academician) of the reporting scholar from the evaluations found in each of
the files.
Id. at 338. After completing redaction, the university should give a copy of the redacted and the
unredacted files to the district court. The court will then review both fies, and if it determines
that it is necessary for the party to have access only to the redacted file, then the court will make
the redacted file available. Id. To obtain more information, information not found in the redacted
file, the EEOC should show a particularized need for the information. In determining whether to
compel further discovery of the material covered by the qualified privilege, the court would utilize
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tional standard for addressing the redaction issue.
The Seventh Circuit cautioned, however, that it would not allow
the EEOC access to redacted files in all instances. 192 How available will
redacted records be? In Franklin & Marshall College,95 the most re-
cent decision to address the question of redaction, the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's order instructing that information revealing
the evaluator's identity be redacted.19 4 The court did not analyze the
redaction issue in that case probably because the university offered re-
dacted files, and the EEOC was willing to accept them."'
University of Pennsylvania has been remanded for the district
court to decide whether the university will be allowed to redact identi-
fying information from the peer review materials. 9 In arguing for re-
daction before the Third Circuit, the university relied on Franklin &
Marshall College. 9 7 The EEOC, on the other hand, argued that Frank-
lin & Marshall College does not set a rule for automatic redaction and
that in this instance redacted information would be useless.'98 The
Third Circuit indicated that, based on its study of the limited record,
redaction should be allowed.' 9
At first glance, redaction appears to be a good compromise for
courts because both the university and the plaintiff benefit. By remov-
ing the names and other identifying words, the court actually may help
preserve some of the confidentiality eroded by compelled disclosure,2 00
thereby salving, even if only slightly, the wounds wrought by the Su-
preme Court's decision. The plaintiff, on the other hand, would gain
a balancing test and make the plaintiff show a "compelling necessity" for the specific information
requested. Id.
The Seventh Circuit believed that this procedure would "accommodate the competing inter-
ests which are at stake and... prevent an EEOC investigation from becoming 'a fishing expedi-
tion,' or exploratory surgery without the required prior medical testing, screening, evaluation and
diagnosis." Id. at 339.
192. Id. at 337 n.4. The court also pointed out that the instant case was unique because
Notre Dame voluntarily disclosed redacted files to the EEOC. Normally "there must be substance
to the charging party's claim and thorough discovery conducted before even redacted fies are
made available." Id.
193. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d at 110.
194. Id. at 117.
195. Id. at 112.
196. See University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d at 969, aff'd, 110 S. Ct. at 577.
197. 850 F.2d at 982.
198. Id.
199. Id. The court noted that the university had offered good reasons for redaction: (1) the
EEOC had not insisted on unredacted records in similar cases in the past, and (2) the identity of
evaluators was irrelevant to the finding of discrimination. Id. at 982 & n.10.
200. See Blum, supra note 163, at A17, col. 1. Daniel Steiner, vice-president and general
counsel at Harvard, which filed a brief in support of the University of Pennsylvania, stated: "We
have to look for alternatives to deal with a situation which might deter totally candid evaluations.
Redaction might help considerably in preserving confidentiality and the tenure process." Id.
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access to all of the desired information, with the exception of the evalu-
ators' identities. As long as redaction is executed properly, any evidence
of discrimination still would exist. Not only is redaction fair to both
parties, it also upholds the congressional intent of preventing delay dur-
ing the EEOC investigation stage.2 1'
Some problems may lurk beneath the surface for both parties, how-
ever. From the university's perspective, will redaction provide enough
confidentiality? A plaintiff in a small department of a small college who
obtains a peer review file after redaction probably could identify the
evaluator simply based on knowledge of the evaluator's typical com-
ments or concerns and the evaluator's writing style or handwriting or
the print type of a computer printer or typewriter.
From the plaintiff's perspective, will redacted records be effective
in proving a Title VII case? The university might redact information
beyond the mere identity of the evaluator. But even if the files are
properly redacted, the EEOC has argued that redacted records would
be useless.20 2 Under the Seventh Circuit's procedures, if the EEOC
gained access to redacted files and then wanted to get information from
the nonredacted files, the EEOC would be required to meet a very high
showing of particularized need. 03
3. Gray's Balancing Test
In Gray v. Board of Higher Education2'" a black educator at a
community college brought a civil rights action 20 5 after being denied
tenure. In response to Gray's motion to compel discovery of two votes
of tenure committee members,20 6 the Second Circuit refused to adopt
either a privilege or a rule of complete disclosure. 7 Instead, the court
201. See University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d at 978 (noting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5),
under which judges have the duty to "cause the case to be in every way expedited"). The court also
referred to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9, which states that the EEOC subpoena power enables it to fulfill its
investigative role and to obtain information necessary for determining if there is reasonable cause
to believe a charge is true. Id.
202. Id. at 982; see Gray, Faculty Members Who File Tenure Grievances Should Have Ac-
cess to Relevant Personnel Files, The Chronicle of Higher Educ., Nov. 1, 1989, at B1, col. 1. Gray
stated that if an evaluator truly and openly held hostility for the candidate, the identity of such
person would be important because the evaluation could be discounted in value. On the other
hand, removal of the evaluator's name would prevent the plaintiff from recognizing the identity
and, thus, the evaluation might be afforded undue weight. Id. at B3, col. 1.
203. See University of Notre Dame, 715 F.2d at 338.
204. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
205. The plaintiff brought the action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, not Title VII.
Id.
206. Id. at 903.
207. Id. at 908. The court recognized that a rule of complete privilege "would frustrate rea-
sonable challenges to the fairness of hiring decisions" and that a rule of complete disclosure would
"chill peer review decisions." Id. The court held that "absent a statement of reasons, the balance
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took a more cautious approach and adopted a balancing test, 08 which
compared the professor's need for information to prove discrimination
with the institution's concern for confidentiality. Both the Fourth209
and Ninth Circuits21 0 also appear to have accepted a balancing
approach.
Although the Third Circuit considered both a privilege and a bal-
ancing test in EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania,11 the Supreme
Court's holding addresses only the narrow issue of privilege. The Gray
balancing test is not mentioned explicitly in the Court's opinion and
apparently never was considered. For this reason, universities are not
barred from arguing that the Gray balancing test should be applied and
that the needs of the university outweigh those of the plaintiff.
In dicta in University of Pennsylvania, however, the Court stated
that requiring the EEOC to demonstrate a specific reason for disclosure
would create much litigation, thus hindering the EEOC's attempts to
investigate and remedy discrimination.212 If the Court was implying
that any judicial standard would be an obstacle for the plaintiff, then
the Court also would reject the Gray test. Because the congressional
policy is to limit delay at the EEOC investigation stage, courts should
reject the Gray balancing test. Whether courts will do so willingly or
whether the Gray question will go to the Supreme Court is yet to be
seen.
4. Statutory Protection
Although currently no states have statutes granting a privilege for
academic peer review materials, several states do have such statutory
protection for the hospital peer review process.2 " Hospitals may have
succeeded in getting a statutory privilege because, unlike the academic
area, all attempts to secure a judicial privilege for hospital review
materials have failed.214 Now that the Supreme Court has foreclosed the
possibility of a privilege based either on common law or academic free-
tips toward discovery and away from recognition of privilege." Id.
208. Id. at 904-05.
209. See Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.) (stating that it "was, of
course, necessary for the court to balance this interest of the College against the need of the plain-
tiff for such material"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
210. See Zaustinsky v. University of California, 96 F.R.D. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd without
opinion, 782 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Recent Development, supra note 126, at 1427-28
(discussing Zaustinsky).
211. 850 F.2d at 969; see also Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d at 110.
212. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 584.
213. See Privileged Communications, supra note 122, at 1627 nn.201 & 202 (listing state
statutes).
214. Id. at 1627.
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dom, universities may lobby for statutory protection.
V. REMEDIES AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Case Law Addressing Remedies for University Title VII
Plaintiffs
Because university Title VII plaintiffs are rarely victorious, courts
seldom have reached the question of remedy. 15 The University of
Pennsylvania ruling, however, should lead to increased disclosure of
peer review documents, which in turn could produce better evidence of
discrimination, and, thus, more judicial findings of discrimination.
Courts must be prepared to create proper remedies.
Under Title VII courts can enjoin thd defendant's discriminatory
practices and order appropriate affirmative action.216 Remedies could
include "reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
[or] any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. ' 21 7 Title
VII was designed to remove discrimination from society" 8 and to make
the plaintiff whole.21 9 For Title VII to be effective, these purposes
should be reflected in the judicial remedy.2
Back pay and reinstatement are presumptively favored remedies
under Title VII.22 ' Arguably, however, money damages will not serve
the purposes of Title VII properly. Money damages do not make the
plaintiff whole because the plaintiff still will be deprived of tenure.222
Neither will money damages eliminate discrimination because some de-
fendants would "buy the right to discriminate. '23 Despite the noted
shortcomings of back pay as a remedy in tenure cases, that remedy is
still presumptively favored for successful Title VII plaintiffs224 and has
been awarded in tenure cases.225
In 1980 one commentator argued that only one remedy, the award
215. See Note, Title VII on Campus: Judicial Review of University Employment Decisions,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 1206 (1982).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
217. Id.
218. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975).
219. See id. at 421.
220. See Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARv. L. REV. 457, 463
(1980). For more information on Title VII remedies, see Note, supra note 7, at 1447-48.
221. See Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988).
222. Note, supra note 220, at 465 (stating that the plaintiff still will be "deprived of the
intangible benefits of a tenured ... position, such as job security, prestige, personal satisfaction,
and enhanced professional opportunities").
223. Id. at 466.
224. Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d at 1333 (urging district court to award back pay instead of tenure
as remedy on remand).
225. See Kumar v. Trustees of the Univ. of Mass., 566 F. Supp. 1299, 1330 (D. Mass. 1983);
see also Ford v. Nicks, 741 F.2d 858, 864 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216 (1984).
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of tenure, can make a plaintiff whole once a university has denied ten-
ure on the basis of discrimination.226 In the same year Kunda v. Muh-
lenberg College227 became the first decision to uphold the award of
tenure as a remedy.228 For years Kunda stood alone as a sole beacon of
hope for Title VII crusaders in the academic world and a single, but
terrifying, threat to universities.
Today, however, Kunda should not be seen as an oddity. The ranks
of courts that recognize the possibility of awarding tenure as a remedy
continue to grow. To date three appellate decisions have approved ten-
ure as an appropriate remedy. 2 9 Courts have begun to recognize that
just because discrimination occurs in an academic rather than a com-
mercial setting, the court cannot fail to award a meaningful remedy.
23 0
In Pyo v. Stockton State College23 1 the district court denied the
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment that sought to strike
the judicial award of tenure as a possible remedy. 2  The court found
that the judicial award of tenure was within the court's power. As long
as the plaintiff has proven that discrimination affected the tenure deci-
sion and that the remedy would make the plaintiff whole and not create
a windfall, tenure would be an appropriate remedy.2
33
The most recent decision to follow Kunda is the 1989 First Circuit
decision in Brown v. Trustees of Boston University.2 4 In Brown a jury
found that but for sexual discrimination, Ms. Brown would have been
awarded tenure.23 5 Based on that finding, the court awarded Ms. Brown
an associate professorship and tenure. 36
The Kunda rule is relatively narrow because it requires not only
that discrimination be the reason for denial, but also that a candidate's
qualifications be undisputed.3 7 Often, however, a candidate's qualifica-
tions are in dispute. Pyo asserts that tenure is still a proper remedy if
the plaintiff can demonstrate that others with similar qualifications
226. See Note, supra note 220, at 476.
227. 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
228. The court awarded tenure to the physical education instructor conditioned on the
achievement of a masters degree. Id. at 534-35.
229. See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1989); Ford, 741 F.2d at
858; Kunda, 621 F.2d at 532; see also Pyo v. Stockton State College, 603 F. Supp. 1278 (D.N.J.
1985).
230. Kunda, 621 F.2d at 550.
231. Pyo, 603 F. Supp. at 1278.
232. Id. at 1281.
233. Id.
234. 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3217 (1990).
235. Id. at 362.
236. Id.
237. See Pyo, 603 F. Supp. at 1283 (construing Kunda, 621 F.2d at 532).
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were granted tenure.28  The First Circuit reached the same conclusion
in Brown.2 9 Even if a dispute about a candidate's qualifications exists,
the dispute is not an absolute bar to a tenure remedy.240 In this way,
Pyo and Brown broaden the Kunda holding.
B. Arguments by Academic Institutions
1. Academic Freedom
In both Kunda and Brown, the academic institutions raised aca-
demic freedom arguments. Muhlenberg College argued that the award
of tenure would violate the institution's academic freedom, but the
Kunda court concluded that the defendant misconstrued the meaning
of academic freedom. 241 The court acknowledged that academic free-
dom should receive maximum protection.242 In granting tenure to
Kunda, however, the court asserted that although academic freedom is
essential to the educational process, it does not affect every employ-
ment decision of an educational institution.2 43
Boston University argued, in Brown, that the award of tenure in-
fringed on the university's right to determine who may teach.244 In re-
sponse, the First Circuit asserted that academic freedom does not give
universities the license or freedom to discriminate.248 Not surprisingly,
the court rejected the university's academic freedom argument.
Both the First and Third Circuits relied on the congressional pur-
pose behind including academic institutions within the scope of Title
VII. Congress discovered that discrimination often occurred in aca-
demic arenas.248 By electing to award tenure after finding that the can-
didate would have been granted tenure but for the sexual
discrimination, the courts carried out congressional policy.
The First and Third Circuits made these decisions before the Su-
preme Court outlined, in University of Pennsylvania, the instances in
which an institution's academic freedom is violated.247 The interpreta-
tion of institutional academic freedom relied on in Kunda and Brown,
238. See id. at 1283-84.
239. Brown, 891 F.2d at 337.
240. Id. at 361-62.
241. See Kunda, 621 F.2d at 547.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Brown, 891 F.2d at 362.
245. Id.
246. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT, supra note 7, at 2155. Congress found that "women have long been
invited to participate as students in the academic process, but without the prospect of gaining
employment as serious scholars." Id.
247. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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however, squares with that of the Supreme Court.248 Neither Kunda nor
Brown presented an issue involving the university's speech content;
therefore, no violation existed under the first part of the Court's test.
Similarly, awarding tenure does not infringe directly on the right to de-
termine who may teach.
One could argue that awarding tenure is the ultimate usurpation of
the university's decision on who may teach. The judicial award of ten-
ure in Kunda and Brown, however, did not violate the institution's aca-
demic freedom. The Supreme Court stated that the university has the
right to determine who may teach, but also specifically stated that this
determination must be made on academic grounds. A finding that dis-
crimination impermissibly entered the determination would thwart the
university's argument. In the words of the Brown court, academic free-
dom "does not include the freedom to discriminate against tenure can-
didates on the basis of sex or other impermissible grounds.
'249
Academic freedom has not proven to be a successful argument
against the prospect of tenure as remedy. This result is the only ra-
tional and just outcome. Once a court has determined that discrimina-
tion caused the denial of tenure,2 50 no reason exists for deferring to the
university's decision-making process. Once discrimination is discovered,
Title VII policies automatically should outweigh university concerns.
2. Freedom of Association
Defendant institutions also have argued that the award of tenure is
unreasonable and intrusive because it creates a lifetime relationship be-
tween the parties. 251 Forcing an association in an area in which people
must work closely together is troublesome. Now that Kunda and Brown
strongly have rejected academic freedom arguments, institutions may
argue freedom of association more strenuously in the remedy area.
In a similar setting, law firms have made first amendment freedom
of association arguments to prevent the remedy of partnership.252 In
Hishon v. King & Spalding255 the Supreme Court asserted that, al-
though discrimination could be characterized as a form of freedom of
association protected by the first amendment, the courts never have
248. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 586-87.
249. Brown, 891 F.2d at 362.
250. In Brown the jury found that but for sex discrimination, Brown immediately would have
been granted tenure. Id.
251. See id. at 361. See generally Note, supra note 220, at 468-71 (addressing the problem of
forced association).




protected discrimination.5 4 The Court held that the plaintiff had stated
a cause of action and remanded the matter for trial.255
The Hishon decision provides a prediction for the future: An aca-
demic institution's arguments based on forced association must fail
once discrimination has been established. Cases may exist, however, in
which a court is unwilling to award tenure even after discrimination is
discovered.2 56 For example, if forced association would provoke animos-
ity, tenure may be an inappropriate remedy. 57
When addressing these problems, courts should consider the fol-
lowing factors: The size of the group, the nature of its professional
working relationship, the amount of interaction anticipated, the sup-
port the group has for the plaintiff, and the feelings the plaintiff has for
the group.25 Moreover, if a plaintiff has strong adverse feelings about
the university or the department, then tenure would not be satisfying
for either party. On the other hand, if the plaintiff still harbors good
feelings for the department, and the department has expressed strong
support for the plaintiff, then tenure would be an appropriate
remedy.25 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Higher education experts predict that many colleges and universi-
ties soon will begin to restrict their tenure systems.260 As of 1988, sixty-
three percent of all faculty members were tenured,26' but that percent-
age is expected to fall in the near future. 62 Academic institutions will
make several changes to limit the number of tenured faculty. First, they
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Even the courts that have allowed tenure as a remedy recognize that it is not the appro-
priate remedy in every case. The Sixth Circuit faced this issue again in Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860
F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988). In giving the district court advice on fashioning a remedy, the court
stated that reinstatement with tenure should be granted only in the most exceptional cases. Id. at
1333. The Third, Circuit found in Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115 (1980), that tenure as a
remedy would be drastic relief in that case because, unlike Kunda, the faculty had never evaluated
the candidate. Id. at 1125-26.
257. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (grant-
ing money damages because advertising executive's animosity would make reinstatement impracti-
cal), cited in Shanor & Shanor, supra note 13, at 151.
258. Note, supra note 220, at 469. The author also discusses other arguments of defendants,
including unique personal qualities and the difficulty of discharge.
259. For example, in Brown the court found that "Brown's near unanimous endorsement by
colleagues within and without her department suggest strongly that there are no issues of collegial-
ity or the like which might make the granting of tenure inappropriate." 891 F.2d at 362-63.
260. See Mangan, Colleges are Attempting to Redefine Tenure Policies, but Many Faculty





are likely to hire more part-time faculty members who are not eligible
for tenure.6 3 Second, they may impose evaluations after tenure has
been granted; these evaluations could lead to dismissal.264 Third, uni-
versities may lengthen the traditional six or seven year probationary
period.6 5
Restricting the tenure system eventually may channel the United
States towards the British response to tenure. In 1988 the British Par-
liament voted to abolish tenure for new faculty members.266 At the
same time, however, Parliament codified academic freedom.267 Now
both individual professors and the institution enjoy academic freedom
protection.2 8
Although the abolition of the American tenure system might be a
pessimistic vision, the trend toward a restricted academic tenure system
seems to be a reality. The recent decisions disallowing a privilege for
peer review materials and those awarding tenure as a remedy certainly
will not cause the demise of the tenure system; neither will these cases
strengthen it. Universities view discovery in discrimination suits as
wreaking havoc on the entire peer review process. In the wake of Kunda
and Brown, universities doubtless feel threatened by the judiciary's
power to make an award of tenure against the university's will.
Because tenure is intended to protect academic freedom, restriction
of the tenure system will leave faculty exposed. Without the protection
of academic freedom, a professor's teaching, research, and extramural
speech will be threatened. Ironically, in response to the denial of a
broad protection through institutional academic freedom in University
of Pennsylvania and Brown, universities may begin chipping away at
the professor's academic freedom by restricting the tenure system.
In University of Pennsylvania the Supreme Court endorsed insti-
tutional academic freedom. Although the Court still did not explain
why the academic institution should enjoy such protection, institutional
academic freedom is apparently here to stay. In instances involving the
institution and a faculty member, an impossible zero-sum game seems
to exist. With University of Pennsylvania as precedent, however, the
faculty member at least has the chance to prepare a case properly and
the chance to be successful.
Changes in judicial stance on discovery and remedy may mark the
263. Id. at All, col. 1.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See Walker, British Parliament Votes to End Tenure for New Faculty Members at





beginning of the end for judicial deference to university decisions. The
fact that similar changes also are coming to the area of burdens of proof
in other Title VII actions reinforces that conclusion. For example, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins28 9 may encourage courts to review tenure deci-
sions and to listen to faculty claims.Y Under Price Waterhouse, if a
court finds that discrimination entered into the decision not to grant
tenure, then the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the same decision would have been made regardless of the
discrimination. 1 Price Waterhouse could lead to more successful Title
VII actions in the university setting by increasing the number of cases
heard and by changing the burden of proof. University plaintiffs now
have the same opportunity for discovery as other Title VII plaintiffs,
and they have gained the chance to obtain a meaningful remedy.
University Title VII plaintiffs certainly will not have an easy time
sustaining a discrimination action and obtaining the award of tenure,
but that result is possible now. Some problems are foreseeable. Courts
could choose to maintain a deferential stance and to use overly restric-
tive protective orders, or could use the Gray test, thus leaving the uni-
versity plaintiff in just as weak a position as the qualified privilege
would have created.
When Congress brought universities within the scope of Title VII,
it intended for tenure decisions to be exposed to the same enforcement
actions available for employment decisions in other areas.272 University
of Pennsylvania embodies that intent and puts university Title VII
plaintiffs on the road to equal treatment. Furthermore, Kunda and
Brown have brought university Title VII plaintiffs within the realm of
remedies available to other Title VII plaintiffs. Finally, Price
Waterhouse should encourage more judicial review of tenure decisions.
After eighteen years the courts finally have effectuated congressional
intent and brought university Title VII plaintiffs up to par with other
Title VII plaintiffs.
Clisby Louise Hall Barrow
269. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
270. See Jashcik, Ruling Seen Helping Professors Bring Discrimination Cases: Supreme
Court Puts Burden of Proof on Employers, The Chronicle of Higher Educ., May 10, 1989, at Al,
col. 2.
271. Id.
272. See University of Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. at 582-83.
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